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Welcome to Inedo Security Labs

Established in 2023, we are a team of security researchers focused on improving Software Supply Chain Security. We curate the ProGet Vulnerability Database (PGVD) and publish clear, practical write-ups to help teams understand real-world riskβ€”not just theoretical severity.

To better prioritize that risk, we created the ProGet Vulnerability Remediation Scale (PVRS). Instead of relying on CVSS scores, PVRS uses simple categories to reflect real-world impact and urgency. It highlights what can be safely monitored versus what requires immediate action, including the most critical Category 5 vulnerabilities.

  • 213652
    Detected
    Vulnerabilities
  • 239137
    Malicious
    Packages
  • 21
    Category 5
    Vulnerabilties

Latest Vulnerabilities Detected

PVRS CategoryVulnerability IDSummaryPackage
PGV-2676808

A flaw was found in Nautilus. When a removable drive or disk image is unmounted or ejected, Nautilus prompts the user to empty the trash without verifying whether the trash directory paths are symbolic links. An attacker can exploit this flaw by tricking a user into mounting a crafted storage volume and confirming the prompt to empty the trash, leading to the arbitrary deletion of files accessible to that user.

debian/nautilus source, bookworm, debian/nautilus source, forky, debian/nautilus source, trixie

PGV-2676809

A flaw was found in libarchive. An attacker can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) or potential information disclosure due to a use-after-free vulnerability, which occurs when a program reads memory that has already been released. This issue arises when the archive_entry_copy_mac_metadata() function deallocates an internal buffer before completing a data copy. An attacker who can supply input to an application utilizing this function can trigger the flaw to crash the application or read uninitialized memory data.

debian/libarchive source, bookworm, debian/libarchive source, forky, debian/libarchive source, trixie

PGV-2676811

StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength (default 50,000 characters) is intended to bound how much memory a single JSON Object property name can consume while being parsed, independently of the much larger maxStringLength (default 100,000,000 characters) that bounds ordinary string values. For parsers built over character input β€” Reader, String or char[] sources, all served by ReaderBasedJsonParser β€” that bound is not applied while the name is being accumulated. The code path instead re-uses the string-value length check, which is roughly 2000x larger by default. In the character-input slow path, ReaderBasedJsonParser._parseName2() accumulates the name into the TextBuffer and, when a segment fills, calls TextBuffer.finishCurrentSegment(), which validates only maxStringLength. The correct check, StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength(int), is reached afterwards in CharsToNameCanonicalizer.findSymbol(), once the entire name has been scanned to its closing quote. By that point the full name β€” up to maxStringLength characters β€” has already been buffered in memory. A remote attacker who can have a single sufficiently long JSON Object property name parsed through this path can force allocation on the order of 100,000,000 characters (approximately 200 MB, with segment bookkeeping pushing real peak usage higher) before any StreamConstraintsException is thrown, instead of the approximately 50,000-character (about 100 KB) bound the API promises. Repeating this across concurrent requests can exhaust the heap and crash the process. No authentication or user interaction is required. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is disabled by default (-1), nothing else bounds the token first, so the issue is exploitable under default configuration. Byte-input parsers are not affected: UTF8StreamJsonParser, UTF8DataInputJsonParser and the non-blocking (async) parsers re-validate maxNameLength on every growth of the name-decode buffer via ParserBase._growNameDecodeBuffer(), rejecting an oversized name after allocating only tens of kilobytes. Applications are exposed when untrusted JSON is parsed from a String, Reader or char[] β€” for example an HTTP request body already read into a String β€” rather than from raw UTF-8 bytes. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from 2.16.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.16.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength was first introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0.

debian/jackson-core source, bookworm, debian/jackson-core source, forky, debian/jackson-core source, trixie

PGV-2676810

A flaw was found in GIMP. An attacker can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) or potentially disclose sensitive memory contents by convincing a user to open or preview a specially crafted Bohemia Interactive (PAA) texture file. Due to an integer overflow when calculating image dimensions during file decompression, the application allocates an undersized memory buffer. Subsequent processing reads memory past the buffer boundary, terminating the plug-in process unexpectedly.

debian/gimp source, forky

PGV-2676812

A flaw was found in nfs-utils. An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) by sending repeated state notification requests to an exposed rpc.statd service. The service fails to properly release memory allocated during callback processing, leading to continuous memory growth. Sustained requests can exhaust system resources, eventually causing the service to degrade or crash.

debian/nfs-utils source, bookworm, debian/nfs-utils source, forky, debian/nfs-utils source, trixie

Meet the Inedo Security Labs Team

We're a small but focused team that reports directly to Inedo's CEO, Alex Papadimoulis. Our experience is diverse and over a range of domains and technologies, from Java in the banking sector to legacy Windows systems in mining, and advancements in cloud-native and machine learning. And although we're new to the Inedo team, we started with a ton of experience in Inedo's products.

Our Analysts

Pete Barnum
Senior Security Analyst
Pete has a background in regulatory compliance, with a focus on cybersecurity, SDLC auditing, risk management, disaster recovery, and IT vendor management. He's worked the Banking, Logistics, and Government sectors... but not yet the live/traveling entertainment industry.
Kim Pento
Chief Security Researcher
As Chief Security Researcher at Inedo Security Labs, Kim leverages her 20 years of expertise in cybersecurity in highly regulated sectors, oversees the team, and was a key figure alongside Alex Papadimoulis, CEO of Inedo, in the establishment of Inedo Security Labs.
Tod Hoven
Security Analyst
Tod is a former product engineer of ProGet transitioned into a career as a security researcher. Interested in analyzing and dissecting various software and systems to discover potential vulnerabilities and threats, vulnerability assessment, penetration testing, and threat modeling.